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I. INTRODUCTION
Many business dealings of Indians and tribes are subject to trust supervi-
sion by the Secretary of the Interior. Though the Secretary' must act in the best
interests of the Indian or tribe, discretion whether to approve or disapprove a
t Attorney, Oil & Gas Litigation, Groves & Glover, L.L.P., Houston, Texas. Licensed in Oklahoma
and Texas. J.D., University of Oklahoma.
1. Throughout this paper, "Secretary" will be used to denote the Secretary of the Interior or any official
in the decisional chain of command designated to act on his or her behalf.
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commercial venture or alienation of an interest in land still rests with the Secre-
tary. Supervision of oil and gas resources is within the Secretary's responsi-
bility.
This paper focusses on the Secretary of the Interior's ability or duty to
ratify or deny oil and gas communitization agreements where Indian trust land
is sought to be included in an oil and gas production unit, but where the unit
well is located on a tract other than the Indian tract in question. In a string of
four cases, the Tenth Circuit has examined the Secretary's decisional criteria for
performing his trust responsibility, and has imposed restrictions on the
Secretary's actions so that a limit to the trust responsibility may be discerned.
In the confluence of competition between the trust responsibility and separate,
though positive, public policies, the court's endeavor to speak for both has
brought confusion to an already complicated field.
This paper identifies a conflict among the court's decisions and explores
some of the competing forces that generate such contrary results. While the oil
boom and the resultant explosion in property values that precipitated the subject
cases has long since past, it is the nature of the industry to rebound. As long as
there remains oil or other valuable resource in Indian Country, the potential for
conflict will exist. Whether or how this conflict may be resolved is a question
this paper attempts to be a first step in answering.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Trust Doctrine
It is almost always a mistake to seek answers to Indian legal issues by
making analogies to seemingly similar fields. General notions of civil
rights law and public land law, for example, simply fail to resolve many
questions relating to American Indian tribes and individuals. This extraor-
dinary body of law and policy holds its own answers, which are often
wholly unexpected to those unfamiliar with it.2
The relationship between the United States and the Indian Tribes has been
characterized as one of trust from an early time? Though often described by
use of the same terms, there are many levels of the duty owed the Indians. In
its broadest sense the duty is along the lines of a moral obligation toward the
Indians. Congressional action falls within this area. Congress has been given
authority to deal exclusively with the Indians in the Constitution,4 and has of-
ten made decisions more or less favorable to Indian interests in the face of
2. AMERICAN INDIAN PoucY REvIEw COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 99 (Government Printing Office,
1977).
3. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (1 Pet.) 1 (1831). See generally FEUX S. COHEN, HAND-
BOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 207-28 (1982 ed.); STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES
28-36 (2d ed. 1992); WILIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NursHEML 9-56 (2d ed. 1988).
4. Congress was given the power to "regulate Commerce ... with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 3. Another source of federal power lies in the President's power to make treaties, which necessarily
includes Indian treaties. See U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2.
[Vol. 32:779
2
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 32 [1996], Iss. 4, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol32/iss4/3
INDIAN OIL & GAS LEASE COMMUNIT1ZATION
other competing interests or policies.5 The other end of the spectrum is not
unlike a strict fiduciary duty. In discussing the trust doctrine, one must bear in
mind this difference between moral obligation and legal duty; a line not easily
found and one more and more subject to litigation as tribes and individual
Indians attempt to hold the government to the higher standard.6
The line may generally be defined by the specificity of the obligation, the
more specific the obligation the greater the duty owed. Thus, no court has ever
enforced the trust obligation against Congress.7 No specific task can be forced
upon the government unless some treaty, statute or agreement imposes or clear-
ly implies the obligation! But where statutes and regulations impose specific
duties upon the government, specific trust obligations arise. In the case of stat-
utes and regulations expressly authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to man-
age Indian natural resources,
a fiduciary relationship necessarily arises when the Government assumes
such elaborate control over forests and property belonging to Indians. All
of the necessary elements of a common-law trust are present: a trustee
(the United States), a beneficiary (the Indian allottees), and a trust corpus
(Indian timber, lands, [minerals,] and funds).
The government may be held liable in damages for breach of this duty.'0
The doctrine has been perhaps most developed in regard to Indian mineral
resources." "The federal government is the 'fiduciary' of tribal resources,
which means 'that it must act with good faith and utter loyalty to the best
interests' of the Indians."'" In the area of mineral development, the govern-
ment has enacted such a pervasive system of statutes and regulations that the
5. See PEVAR, supra note 3, at 30, 32-33. Most antithetical to Indian interests was the policy of "termi-
nation" (circa 1953-1968) wherein tribes' special relationship with the government was severed and Indians
were to be subject to the same laws, rights, and responsibilities as other U.S. Citizens. Though thought in the
best interest of the tribes at the time, in freeing them from the bureaucracy of the Bureau of Indian Affairs,
the policy of severance of the tribes from the Federal Government is today generally regarded as a failure. See
PEVAR, supra note 3, at 30; CANBY, supra note 3, at 25.
6. See CANBY, supra note 3, at 32-33. See generally Judith V. Royster, Equivocal Obligations: The
Federal-Tribal Trust Relationship and Conflicts of Interest in the Development of Mineral Resources, 71 N.D.
L. REV. 327, 329-34 (1995) (examining the origin and the development of the trust doctrine and the relatively
recent rise of the legally enforceable federal trust obligation); Reid Peyton Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of
the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1213 (1975) (noting the trend toward greater
executive liability but, as of 1975, a cause of action for breach of trust could not yet be stated); ROBERT N.
CLINTON Er AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 233-75 (3d ed. 1991).
7. See CANBY, supra note 3, at 33.
8. See PEVAR, supra note 3, at 27.
9. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983) (Mitchell If).
10. See id. at 226. See also Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 464
(1995) (holding breach of trust responsibility, as determined in 10th Circuit case finding wrongful approval of
communitization agreement, precluded issue in current damage action).
11. See generally, 5 EUGENE KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF Oi. AND GAS § 67.7 (1991); Michael
E. Webster, Mineral Development of Indian Lands: Understanding the Process and Avoiding the Pitfalls, 39
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 2.01-.04 (1993); Louis R. Moore & Michael E. Webster, Indian Leasing, in 2
LAW OF FEDERAL On. AND GAS LEASES ch. 26 (1991) [hereinafter Moore & Webster]; COHEN, supra note 3,
at 531-38.
12. PEVAR, supra note 3, at 27 (citing Final Report, supra note 2, at 128).
1997]
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stronger trust duty arises. 13 Under these statutes and regulations, decisions re-
garding mineral leasing and development are committed to the Secretary's dis-
cretion. 4 The Secretary may not delegate this discretion to state agencies, 5
and may not, through routine procedures "rubber stamp" decisions made by
other agencies or proposals by lessees, but must base his decision on the "best
interests" of the Indian tribe or individual lessor.'6
B. Oil and Gas
1. The Purpose of Conservation
When ownership of oil and gas deposits was first being determined, less
was known about the nature of petroleum deposits. Seeming to appear in ran-
dom locations, oil was analogized to the rules developed for wild animals,
specifically the rule of capture. Under the rule of capture, oil or gas belongs to
whomever can first reduce it to possession. This rule generated intense develop-
ment which was extremely wasteful, both economically and physically, because
it promoted the drilling of more wells than were necessary to efficiently pro-
duce petroleum from a given formation and fostered production practices that
left otherwise recoverable oil in the ground and unrecoverable.
The desire to reduce waste gave rise to the current system of conservation
which, under statutory authority, entrusts state conservation agencies with over-
seeing the orderly development of petroleum resources. Methods used to pre-
vent waste include the regulation of the spacing of wells, the density of drilling,
and limiting the amount of oil and gas taken from a given well or production
area.
In Oklahoma, well spacing and density are controlled through the estab-
lishment of drilling and spacing units." Unlike many states, a drilling unit in
Oklahoma also apportions production from the unit. Production is apportioned
to each owner within the unit on a per acre basis, and the apportionment relates
13. See, e.g., Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g (1983); Indian Mineral De-
velopment Act of 1982, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2108 (1983).
Mhe test is whether "the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions [contain] an enumeration of
duties which would justify a conclusion that Congress intended the Secretary to be a trustee .... "
Mihe federal government's role in mineral leasing is pervasive and its responsibilities comprehen-
sive .... The evident purpose of the statute is to ensure that Indian tribes receive the maximum bene-
fit from mineral deposits on their lands through leasing.... Because the statutes and regulations
contain such an explicit and detailed enumeration of duties, [case law] compels the conclusion that
Congress intended the Secretary to be a trustee.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 728 F.2d 1555, 1564-65 (10th Cir. 1984) (Seymour, J., con-
curring and dissenting), dissent adopted as maj. op. on reh'g en banc, 793 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1986).
14. See infra notes 27-36 and accompanying text. See generally Reid Peyton Chambers & Monroe E.
Price, Regulating Sovereignty: Secretarial Discretion and the Leasing of Indian Lands, 26 STAN. L. REV.
1061 (1974).
15. See Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes v. Board of Oil & Gas Conservation of Montana, 792 F.2d 782
(9th Cir. 1986).
16. See Webster, supra note 11, § 2.0311](b).
17. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1 (Supp. 1996). This should not be confused with unitization, which is
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back to first production, or establishment of the unit, whichever is later.' Well
location within the unit does not affect the apportionment. 9
Formation of the drilling unit serves to apportion production, but not cost
and risk. In order to share the risk of the drilling venture the cost bearing inter-
ests within the drilling unit must be pooled ° Formation of a drilling unit in
Oklahoma automatically pools a 1/8th royalty interest that is free of costs. The
remaining 7/8th interest, whether leased or unleased, is burdened with costs.
That is to say, unleased mineral owners, or non-participating lessees, would be
entitled to their proportionate share of production (based on acreage), but only
after the costs of drilling, completing and operating the well had been recouped
by the operator." In pooling the cost bearing interests, the costs of the well are
apportioned among those pooled, regardless of the amount of production. In this
way the risks of drilling are shared among the respective interest holders, and
not borne solely by the person drilling the well. This may be accomplished
either through voluntary pooling or through resort to the force pooling
statute.
2. State Conservation and Federal Preemption
Not all mineral interests, however, are subject to regulation by state con-
servation agencies. Through the mechanism of federal preemption, federal min-
eral interests are not always subject to state conservation efforts.' Where cor-
relative rights or waste is the issue of regulation, state conservation agencies
have no power to communitize (or pool) absent approval from the Secretary.24
This is particularly true where the land involved is Indian land.'
18. See Ward v. Corporation Comm'n, 501 P.2d 503, 508 (Okla. 1972).
19. See generally KUNTZ, supra note 11, § 77.3.
20. Pooling is known as "communitization" when dealing with federal mineral interests.
Communitization is the term used in the remainder of this paper, it should not be confused with
communization.
21. See Miller v. Wenexco, Inc., 743 P.2d 152, 156 (Okla. 1987) (citation omitted) ("[P]roducing co-ten-
ants must account to the non-producing co-tenants for the pro-rata share of the latter in any net profits derived
from the mineral exploration.").
22. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1 (Supp. 1996). This statute covers both the establishment of drilling
units and pooling. This dual coverage, and the wording of the statute, has at times caused confusion and lack
of differentiation between formation of a drilling unit and pooling the interests within the unit. See, e.g.,
Ward, 501 P.2d at 506-07.
23. See generally, 6 HOwARD R. WnLiAMs & CHARLEs J. MEYERs, OIL AND GAS LAW § 905.1 n.49
(1991); 1 Bruce M. Kramer & Patrick H. Martin, The Law of Pooling and Unitization, § 16.05 (3d ed. 1995);
KUNTZ, supra note 11, § 70.3; Richard K. Books, Comment, Oil and Gas: The Effect of Oklahoma Conserva-
tion Laws on Federal and Indian Lands, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 994 (1976); Brian T. Dolan, State Jurisdiction
Over Non-Indian Mineral Activities on Indian Reservations, 21 ROCKY MTN. MIN L. INST. 475 (1975). Cf
Edward B. Berger & William J. Mounce, Applicability of State Conservation and Other Laws to Indian and
Public Lands, 16 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 347 (1971).
24. See Kirkpatrick Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 675 F.2d 1122, 1126 (10th Cir. 1982).
25. See generally Webster, supra note 11, § 2.03[12].
1997]
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However, for the very reasons that lack of controlled development leads to
the ills of the unchecked rule of capture, the federal government has followed a
policy of submitting to state control, at least where oil and gas resources are
involved. Through voluntary acquiescence, conservation agency expertise is
utilized and efficient, orderly development is fostered for the benefit of all
owners, while averting regulatory conflicts. In some instances, the Secretary, or
Bureau of Land Management (BLM), has negotiated understandings with state
conservation agencies where communitization and drilling unit determinations
would be given effect, unless the Secretary objects. Though not relinquishing
control, this practice demonstrates the long history of cooperation with state
conservation agencies regarding conservation determinations.'s
Though this may be satisfactory for public lands, the Secretary has been
specifically prohibited from using such a system where Indian interests are
concerned. The trust responsibility may not be abdicated nor delegated, but rests
with the Secretary.'
In Samedan Oil Corp. v. Cotton Petroleum Corp.,'a lessors of Indian min-
eral interests could not participate in production from neighboring leases,
though all the leases were within the same state ordered drilling and spacing
unit. The Secretary had previously promulgated regulations suspending the
operation of any state or local regulation on Indian land 9 The Oklahoma Cor-
poration Commission had no authority to include the Indian tracts within the
spacing unit without secretarial approval' As the primary lease term ended
prior to secretarial approval, the leases lapsed for lack of production.' Similar-
ly, the Interior Board of Land Appeals has recognized the Bureau of Indian
26. See David G. Ebner, State and Local Regulation of Activities on Federal Oil and Gas Leases, in 2
LAW OF FEDERAL OiL AND GAs LEASES § 24.03[3] (1991).
27. See Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes v. Board of Oil & Gas Conservation of Mont., 792 F.2d 782 (9th
Cir. 1986).
28. 466 F. Supp. 521 (W.D. Okla. 1978).
29. See 25 C.F.R. § 1.4 (1996). That section reads:
§ 1.4 State and local regulation of the use of Indian property.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, none of the laws, ordinances, codes,
resolutions, rules or other regulations of any State or political subdivision thereof limiting, zoning or
otherwise governing, regulating, or controlling the use or development of any real or personal proper-
ty, including water rights, shall be applicable to any such property leased from or held or used under
agreement with and belonging to any Indian or Indian tribe, band, or community that is held in trust
by the United States or is subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States.
(b) The Secretary of the Interior or his authorized representative may in specific cases or in
specific geographic areas adopt or make applicable to Indian lands all or any part of such laws, ordi-
nances, codes, resolutions, rules or other regulations referred to in paragraph (a) of this section as he
shall determine to be in the best interest of the Indian owner or owners in achieving the highest and
best use of such property. In determining whether, or to what extent, such laws, ordinances, codes,
resolutions, rules or other regulations shall be adopted or made applicable, the Secretary or his autho-
rized representative may consult with the Indian owner or owners and may consider the use of, and
restrictions or limitations on the use of, other property in the vicinity, and such other factors as he
shall deem appropriate.
Id.
30. See Samedan, 466 F. Supp. at 526. But cf Currey v. Corporation Comm'n of Okla., 617 P,2d 177,
180 (Okla. 1979) (finding that Corporation Commission order requiring plugging of wells on Indian leases
was not preempted).
31. See Samedan, 466 F. Supp. at 526. It should be noted that the first lease had expired of its own
terms prior to any drilling or submission of a communitization agreement. This distinguishes this case from
those following in Part III, infra.
6
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Affairs' exclusive authority to set drilling and spacing requirements for Indian
mineral interests.
32
The requisite of secretarial approval is also recognized in regard to fee
lands, as was demonstrated in Kardokus v. Walsh." Where the "unit well" is
on Indian land, even though production or drilling activity has begun, until the
drilling unit has been approved by the Secretary, activity on the Indian land is
not attributable to the unit and therefore leases on fee lands within the same
(proposed) drilling unit will not pass into the secondary term by virtue of their
pooling or drilling clauses.'
It should be noted that there are two separate approvals under discussion.
The first is inclusion in the drilling and spacing unit, and the second for
communitization. Requests submitted to the conservation agency (the Oklahoma
Corporation Commission) to establish a drilling unit, and for pooling that unit,
are often submitted and approved together. Likewise, when seeking secretarial
approval, request for inclusion within the drilling and spacing unit is a requisite
part of the communitization application. However, they are not one and the
same. For Indian land, authority for approving drilling and spacing units, or
rather, submitting to state concurrent jurisdiction regarding drilling and spacing
units, is found in the Code of Federal Regulations, title 25, section 1.4(b)."
Authority for approval of communitization agreements is found in the particular
statutes authorizing mineral leasing, which for the purposes of this paper is the
Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938.36
Statutory authority in Oklahoma for setting drilling and spacing units, as
well as pooling and force pooling, are contained in the same statute." By op-
eration of the statute, those mineral owners that are unleased are treated as
royalty owners for 1/8 of their interest, and working interest owners for 7/8 of
their interest. For owners of unleased fee lands, their 7/8 working interest may
be force pooled and effectively sold to other working interest owners should
they decide not to participate in drilling the unit well. However, where the
Commission is without authority to require inclusion within the drilling unit
(e.g. Indian land absent secretarial approval), the respective owners are free to
drill wells on their own tracts. Section 87.1 states that these separate wells will
then be limited in the amount of allowed production in proportion to the size of
each tract in relation to the whole drilling (and proration) unit.
32. See San Juan Citizens Alliance, 129 Interior Bd. Land App. 1 (1994), available in LEXIS, Energy
Library, IBLA file.
33. 797 P.2d 322 (Okla. 1990).
34. See id. at 325. See also OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1(e) (Supp. 1996) (noting that the Commission
may be without authority to require pooling in some instances).
35. See supra note 29.
36. 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g (1983). This act applies to unallotted lands. For allotted lands, authority lies
under 25 U.S.C. § 396 (1983), first adopted in 1909. The Indian Mineral Development Act, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 2101-2108 (1983), was adopted in 1982 and was not yet in use at the time the leases under discussion
were entered into. See generally Webster, supra note 11, § 2.02.
37. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1 (Supp. 1996).
19971
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It should also be possible that the Secretary could approve inclusion within
the drilling unit, which would allocate production, but yet not approve an allo-
cation of cost and risk by way of a communitization agreement. If this were the
case then the Indian tracts within the drilling unit would be a net profits inter-
est.
III. RECENT CASES - "BET INTERESTS" AND
THE ALL RELEVANT FACTORS TEST
The "best interests" of the Indian or tribe is a measure that is used
throughout the statutes and regulations regulating Indian affairs. In the current
context, in considering approval of communitization agreements, the Secretary
has broad discretion; a discretion limited, however, by the best interests of the
Indian mineral owner. There is disagreement as to the nature or shape of this
limitation.38 Indeed, the "best interests" of the Indian or tribe is the essence of
the trust responsibility, and in the restraints placed on secretarial discretion, by
the courts' understanding of "best interests," we see reflected the modem shape
of the trust doctrine.
The following four cases all involve remarkably similar facts. They all
entail the Secretary's decision of whether to approve a communitization agree-
ment, committing Indian mineral leases39 to joint development with fee lands
where the joint well would be on land other than the lease in question. In all of
these cases, the communitization agreement was submitted prior to expiration of
the lease, drilling had commenced within the communitization area, and the
lessee had otherwise complied with all lease terms. Further, all the leases con-
tained a clause permitting communitization which read:
The parties hereto agree to subscribe to and abide by any agreement for
the cooperative or unit development of the field or area, affecting the
leased lands, or any pool thereof, if and when collectively adopted by a
majority operating interest therein and approved by the Secretary of the
Interior, during the period of supervision.
38. See generally Webster, supra note 11, § 2.03[14]; Moore & Webster, supra note I1, § 26.15;
KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 23, § 16.06.
39. All leases under discussion were under the authority of the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938. See
infra note 41 (listing statutory and regulatory authority for leasing) and note 90 (discussing the Indian Mineral
Development Act and limitations of the Indian Mineral Leasing Act).
40. Cotton Petro. Corp. v. United States Dept. of Interior, 870 F.2d 1515, 1516 (10th Cir. 1989); Chey-
enne-Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma v. United States, 966 F.2d 583, 585 (10th Cir. 1992); Woods Petroleum
Corp. v. Dept. of Interior, 47 F.3d 1032, 1035 n.1 (10th Cir. 1995).
[Vol. 32:779
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As we have seen, approval of communitization agreements is committed to
the discretion of the Secretary.4' In exercising his discretion, however, the Sec-
retary has not always met with approval from the 10th Circuit, as the following
cases demonstrate.
A. Kenai
The first of the quartet, Kenai Oil and Gas, Inc. v. Department of Interi-
or,42 is set in Utah, while the rest arose in Oklahoma. In Kenai, the lessee
sought to communitize an unproductive Indian lease with fee land which had a
producing well and submitted a communitization agreement for approval the
weekend before the expiration of the ten year lease term. The Superintendent,43
after studying the information available over the weekend, decided not to ap-
prove the communitization agreement, believing it not to be in the best econom-
ic interests of the Indians.44
The court recognized that approval of communitization agreements is with-
in the discretion of the Secretary,45 and though the statute has no specific stan-
dards governing the Secretary's conduct, his discretion is "limited by the fidu-
ciary responsibilities vested in the United States as trustee of Indian lands."'
The Department of Interior is charged with administration of oil and gas leases
on restricted tribal lands,47 and the Secretary, as trustee, "must manage Indian
lands so as to make them profitable for the Indians. As a fiduciary for the Indi-
ans, the Secretary is responsible for overseeing the economic interests of Indian
lessors, and has a duty to maximize lease revenues."'  As the Secretary's ac-
tion was a discretionary action subject to judicial review,49 the scope of review
is whether the Secretary's action was arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or contrary to law. "If the Superintendent considered all relevant factors in
41. For tribal land, statutory authority resides in 25 U.S.C. § 396d (1983):
All operations under any oil, gas, or other mineral lease issued pursuant to the terms of sections 396a
to 396g of this title or any other Act affecting restricted Indian lands shall be subject to the rules and
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior. In the discretion of the said Secretary, any
lease for oil or gas issued under the provisions of sections 396a to 396g of this title shall be made
subject to the terms of any reasonable cooperative unit or other plan approved or prescribed by said
Secretary prior or subsequent to the issuance of any such lease which involves the development or
production of oil or gas from land covered by such lease.
The accompanying regulation is 25 C.F.R. § 211.21(b) (1996):
(b) All such leases shall be subject to any cooperative or unit development plan affecting the leased
lands that may be required by the Secretary of the Interior, but no lease shall be included in any
cooperative or unit plan without prior approval of the Secretary of the Interior and consent of the
Indian tribe affected.
For allotted land, by virtue of 25 U.S.C. §396 (1983), which grants authority to make regulations necessary
for leasing allotted lands, regulatory authority is contained in 25 C.F.R. § 212.24(c):
(c) All leases issued pursuant to the regulations in this part shall be subject to a co-operative or unit
development plan affecting the leased lands if and when required by the Secretary of the Interior.
42. 671 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1982).
43. The Superintendent was acting as a designee in authority for the Secretary.
44. See Kenai, 671 F.2d at 387.
45. See id. at 385-86. See also 25 U.S.C. § 396d (1983); supra note 41 and accompanying text.
46. Kenai, 671 F.2d at 386.
47. See id.; 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g (1983).
48. Kenai, 671 F.2d at 386 (citing Gray v. Johnson, 395 F.2d 533, 536 (10th Cir. 1968)).
49. See Kenai, 671 F.2d at 386.
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reaching his decision and has made no clear error of judgment, his action can-
not be overturned."'s
The lessees contended that the Superintendent exceeded the scope of his
discretion by considering economic factors5 They felt that, due to the statuto-
ry and regulatory restraints, the Superintendent could only act to preserve Indi-
an natural resources, and that as long as the communitization agreement was
sound in production and conservation respects, the Secretary could not consider
economic factors in considering approval of the agreement. 2
Both the district court 3 and the Tenth Circuit found that this asserted lim-
itation on the Superintendent's discretion "has no basis in the statute or regula-
tion." 4 On the contrary, the court found that limiting the Superintendent's
discretion solely to conservation considerations would be inconsistent with the
trust responsibility and that in determining the best interests he may take into
consideration all factors affecting the Indian interests and may reject a plan that
is economically unsatisfactory 5
After Kenai, the Secretary established guidelines so that Superintendents
and Area Directors of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) could evaluate pro-
posed communitization agreqments in accord with Kenai's "all relevant factors"
test.
B. Cotton Petroleum
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. United States Department of Interior,6 in-
volved multiple Indian tracts within a 640 acres drilling and spacing unit. In-
cluded in the lease were commence drilling and communitization provisions like
we have seen previously. 7 The communitization agreement was submitted four
days before any of the leases were to expire. The Superintendent of the Agency,
after consultation with the Minerals Management Service (MMS), a required
step in the process, forwarded the agreement to the Area Director for final ap-
proval. One Indian owner, Rose, objected, but the Area Director nonetheless
approved the agreement5
50. Id. (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)).
51. See Kenai, 671 F.2d at 386. Appellants also contended that the Superintendent's procedure in reach-
ing his decision was defective. See id. As this issue was answered in the negative and does not reach the issue
of this paper or subsequent cases, it has been ignored.
52. See id.
53. Kenai Oil and Gas, Inc. v. Dept. of Interior, 522 F. Supp. 521, 534 (D. Utah 1981).
54. Kenai, 671 F.2d at 387 (citation omitted).
55. See id. Note that this is a license to consider economic criteria, not a limitation.
56. 870 F.2d 1515 (10th Cir. 1989).
57. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
58. The court noted:
The Area Director observed that: the primary purpose for leasing constitutes an agreement between
lessor and lessee whereby the ultimate goal is production through a joint effort; refusal to approve a
communitization agreement defeats the primary purpose of the lease; the agreement had been timely
submitted before any affected lease had expired and the drilling operations on the unit had been
diligent; and, it is not feasible to release an isolated 80-acre tract because it is not likely that an oil
company would be interested in drilling the second well, when it has been determined that the com-
mon source of supply may be drained by one well.
Cotton, 870 F.2d at 1517.
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The owner appealed to the Secretary of the Interior who, acting through
the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs (Operations), reversed the approval for
the Rose tract, causing the lease to expire. The Secretary further held that, as
unleased restricted Indian landowners within the unit, they were entitled to 8/8
of production for their 80 acres,59 or 12.65 percent of all production, under the
terms of the communitization agreement.'
Cotton filed suit in District Court, which upheld the Secretary's action,
finding that he had not abused his discretion.6' The Tenth Circuit, however,
found that denial of a communitization agreement, causing a lease to fail, and
approving the same agreement virtually in the same breath, constituted an abuse
of discretion.62 As evidence of the capricious nature of the Secretary's deci-
sion, the court stressed that he gave no explanation for the inconsistent treat-
ment of like situated Indian lessors, that the Secretary had previously approved
the lease of which the communitization clause was a part, and that lease ap-
proval implicitly approved an express promise by the parties to abide by any
communitization agreement adopted for the unit and approved by the Secre-
tary. 3 Disapproving the communitization for the sole purpose of causing the
underlying lease to expire, a lease which the Secretary had already approved,
was arbitrary and capricious."
In Cotton, we find additional support for the decision in the court's deter-
mination of the contractual expectation of the parties. However, the holding
rests on finding that the Secretary abused his discretion in that he did not con-
sider all relevant factors. As noted, after Kenai, the Secretary promulgated
guidelines to assist Superintendents and Area Directors in complying with the
Kenai decision.' The permissiveness in Kenai, that the Secretary may consider
economic factors in exercising his discretion was turned into a strict test in
Cotton, whereby the Secretary must consider all relevant factors, and further,
must document his decision. As the court found, the Secretary had neither fol-
lowed his own guidelines nor documented his departure therefrom; his finding
was arbitrary and capricious.' This represents a substantial break from previ-
ous administrative practice in that, where in violation of guidelines, the most a
court could do would be to remand to the agency for further consideration.67
In stressing "all relevant factors," the court strays from the notion that the Sec-
retary need only consider all relevant factors, and that as long as there is a
59. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1(e) (Supp. 1996).
60. See Cotton, 870 F.2d at 1517. See infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text (discussing possible
confusion between approval of communitization and approval of spacing units).
61. See Cotton, 870 F.2d at 1521.
62. See id. at 1527.
63. See id. at 1528. A lessee is entitled to rely on the pooling clause. Kenai, 671 F.2d at 389 (Barrett, J.,
dissenting). Judge Barrett wrote the majority opinion in Cotton.
64. See Cotton, 870 F.2d at 1528.
65. See id. at 1518-19.
66. See id. at 1527.
67. See id. at 1530 (McKay, J., dissenting). Note that Judge McKay wrote the majority opinion in Kenai.
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rational basis for the conclusion, the court may not overturn the determina-
tion.'
C. Cheyenne-Arapaho
The strict procedural test established in Cotton, which was used to strike
the Secretary's decision to let a lease expire, produced just the opposite effect
in Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma v. United States.' In Cheyenne-
Arapaho the Indian lessors appealed the approval of a communitization agree-
ment. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the District court, finding that the Secre-
tary had abused his discretion in approving the communitization agreement.
The court noted that approval of communitization agreements is within the
Secretary's discretion," but that his discretion must be governed by fiduciary
standards and limited by fiduciary duties;7 one duty being to maximize lease
revenues.7 The court repeated the standard of review from Kenai: "If the [Sec-
retary] considered all relevant factors in reaching his decision and has made no
clear error of judgment, his action cannot be overturned." The court found
the issue to be "whether the Secretary considered all the factors relevant to a
fiduciary's decision and whether the Secretary complied with his duty to maxi-
mize lease revenues when he approved the communitization agreements. 74
Admittedly, the reviewing official did not consider market value or market-
ability of a new lease. As the market was in the middle of a boom at the time,
the court found that the market factors should have been examined and there-
fore the trust responsibilities toward the tribe were "uncontrovertedly breached
by failure to examine all relevant factors before approving the agreement."75
As in Kenai, Cotton, and Woods,76 the lessees in Cheyenne-Arapaho ad-
vanced the argument that "the quintessential component of communitization of
leases is whether the proposed plan is reasonable and appropriate for the pur-
pose of proper development and conservation of natural mineral resources," and
as the plan was reasonable and appropriate, the Secretary was within his discre-
tion in approving it.' The Cheyenne-Arapaho court found that this reasoning
ignored the fiduciary relationship. When acting as a fiduciary, the Secretary's
"actions must not merely meet the minimal requirements of administrative law,.
but must also pass scrutiny under more stringent standards demanded of a fidu-
68. See id. at 1531 (McKay, J., dissenting).
69. 966 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1992).
70. See id. at 588 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 396d (1983) and companion regulation 25 C.F.R. § 211.21(b)). See
also supra note 40.
71. See Cheyenne-Arapaho, 966 F.2d at 589.
72. See id. (quoting Kenai, 671 F.2d at 386).
73. See Cheyenne-Arapaho, 966 F.2d at 589 (citations omitted).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 590.
76. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
77. Cheyenne-Arapaho, 966 F.2d at 590. Of course, in Kenai, the argument was that the Secretary's
discretion was limited solely to conservation matters.
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ciary. '78 The fiduciary responsibility does not allow the Secretary the discre-
tion to not consider certain factors. "Absent consideration of current market
developments, the [Secretary's] conclusion that he could not protect the Tribe's
economic interests if the communitization agreements were disapproved was
inconsistent with the agency's fiduciary obligations to the Tribe, and seems
more consistent with a policy of blanket approval than with a policy of maxi-
mizing tribe revenues."79
Cheyenne-Arapaho, in finding that the secretary abused his discretion by
not considering economic factors, does not refer to Cotton accept to distinguish
it (in passing) in a footnote.' It declared itself consistent with Cotton by stat-
ing that Cotton overturned the Secretary's decision because he considered only
economic factors, whereas in Cheyenne-Arapaho, in not considering the eco-
nomic factors, the Secretary did not consider all the factors and would likewise
also be overturned."1 The necessary implication of Cheyenne-Arapaho, howev-
er, contradicts the thrust of Cotton. An important theme in Cotton and Woods is
the impropriety of affecting (canceling) another instrument (the lease) for purely
economic reasons. In Cheyenne-Arapaho, the Secretary was overturned for not
considering the economic conditions. Under the economic reality of the situa-
tion, the Indian lessors would receive no economic benefit, no increased money
or earnings, without the failure of the original lease. For a consideration of the
economic conditions of the time to have any meaning, ne any relevance, it is a
necessary implication that the underlying leases would have to expire. By using
the same "all relevant factors" razor as used in Cotton, Cheyenne-Arapaho cuts
with the same motion, but comes to the contrary result.
D. Woods Petroleum
In the final case of our quatrain we have yet another reversal. Kenai, the
root of the tree, was the only case not to overrule the Secretary. In Cotton, the
Secretary was overruled for letting a lease expire. In Cheyenne-Arapaho, the
Secretary was overruled for letting the lease continue. In Woods Petroleum
Corp. v. Department of Interior," the Secretary was once again overruled for
letting a lease expire. In all four cases the factual setting was the same and the
economic issue was the deciding factor. In Woods, however, by a 7-2 en banc
majority,83 we may have the Tenth Circuit's final word on the matter.
In Woods, the Secretary, after having a best interests assessment per-
formed, chose to disapprove a communitization agreement so that the Indian
lessors could enter into more profitable leases. In fact, a $400,000 bonus had
already been offered for a new lease. The tract was re-leased and a new
78. Id. at 591.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 590 n.14.
81. See id.
82. 47 F.3d 1032 (10th Cir. 1995).
83. It is interesting to note that the two dissenters, Judge Henry and Chief Judge Seymour, are the only
two active judges from Oklahoma on the Tenth Circuit
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communitization agreement prepared by the new lessees was approved eight
months later with an effective date as of the first date of production. In over-
turning the Secretary's decision, the Tenth Circuit Panel found that
the sole reason behind the Secretary's rejection of the communitization
agreement was to provide a pretext for the ulterior motive of enabling the
Indian lessors to acquire an additional bonus payment from a new poten-
tial contracting party.... [To reject a communitization agreement for
that purpose, and then to accept essentially an identical communitization
agreement, particularly while permitting retroactive benefits to inure to the
Indian lessors, constitutes arbitrary and capricious conduct and cannot
stand."
The Tenth Circuit granted rehearing en banc to square itself with the cases
previously discussed and explicitly affrmned the panel decision by holding that
the Secretary acts arbitrarily and abuses his discretion.., when he (1)
rejects a proposed communization [sic] agreement for the sole purpose of
causing the expiration of a valid Indian mineral lease and allowing the
Indian lessors to enter into a new, more lucrative, lease, and then (2)
approves essentially the identical communization [sic] agreement, with the
new lessee of the Indian lands simply substituted for the old lessee, and
permits the Indian lessors to collect royalties retroactively to the date of
first production under the original unit plan.'
Though narrowly stated, a fair reading of the holding essentially requires
communitization agreement approval where the only reason for not doing so is
based on the economics of a new lease. This flies in the face of Kenai and
Cheyenne-Arapaho.
E. The Two Tongues
Woods is certainly consistent with Cotton. The en banc opinion was issued
to square itself with Kenai and Cheyenne-Arapaho. Woods did this by adher-
ence to the all relevant factors test, which of course was used as the operative
tool in all the cases. However, Woods says nothing regarding the fiduciary duty
to maximize lease revenue, as expressed in Cheyenne-Arapaho, and to the ex-
tent that Cheyenne-Arapaho implicitly authorizes lease termination for economic
reasons, it should be considered overruled by Woods. Kenai, read fairly, explic-
itly authorized the expiration of the underlying lease so that a new lease could
be entered into.
Another factor the Woods court used to distinguish the cases was the exis-
tence of a state ordered drilling and spacing unit in Woods and Cotton, which
Woods states did not exist in Kenai or Cheyenne-Arapaho. Woods treats as
synonymous the existence of a drilling and spacing unit and a communitization
agreement. The Oklahoma Corporation Commission may make spacing and
84. Woods Petro. Corp. v. United States Dept. of Interior, 18 F.3d 854, 859-60 (10th Cir. 1994) (herein-
after Woods 1).
85. Woods Petro. Corp. v. Dept. of Interior, 47 F.3d 1032, 1034 (10th Cir. 1995) (hereinafter Woods M1).
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pooling determinations at the same time, but the two are not synonymous. True,
secretarial approval is needed for the operation of either on Indian land, but it
should be noted that the authority to approve drilling and spacing unit determi-
nations 6 and communitization agreements" are separate.
As an example, where an owner owns so much land as to encompass mul-
tiple units of the spacing pattern, or simply the whole spacing unit, there is no
need to communitize the interests as they all reside in a single ownership. Drill-
ing and spacing determinations are made to prevent waste and to allocate pro-
duction whereas communitization agreements allocate (or prorate) cost and risk
among multiple owners within the unit. As discussed above,"8 an interest may
not be subject to force pooling, and yet still be within the framework of the
drilling and spacing pattern.
Indeed, Cheyenne-Arapaho, in finding that the communitization agreement
should not have been approved, found the underlying leases had expired and the
Tribe was therefore the rightful owner of all royalty and working interest and
entitled to revenues attributable to the tracts after the expiration of the leases.8 9
In so finding the court recognized the Secretary's approval of the drilling and
spacing unit and the Tribe's right to be included in the same as an unleased
mineral owner. The argument that the Indian lessors owned all the working
interest after expiration of the lease was put forth in Cotton, as well as Woods,
but was rejected." In this, too, Cotton and Woods conflict with Cheyenne-
Arapaho, a conflict that seems not to have been understood, much less ex-
plained.
Woods, in finding approval of the new communitization agreement arbi-
trary and capricious, even though submitted eight months after the second lease,
argues against the Secretary's ability to ever let a lease lapse, as was approved
in Kenai and mandated in Cheyenne-Arapaho. In any lease market that would
give rise to this situation (i.e. an oil and gas market so active as to bring about
the possibility of much higher bonuses and the concomitant pressure to let
leases expire for economic reasons) there will be much activity. The rectangular
survey in Oklahoma and other Western states and the propensity of most Con-
servation Commissions to lay out drilling and spacing units in a regular pattern,
suggests that once a drilling and spacing unit has been proposed or established,
it is less than likely that it will change, at least in the near future. Under Chey-
86. See 25 C.F.R. § 1.4 (1996). See supra note 29.
87. See supra note 41.
88. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
89. See Cheyenne-Arapaho, 966 F.2d at 587.
90. As Indian interests, they should not be amenable to the force pooling statute, but should indeed be
able to participate as owners of the working interest. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (exanin-
ing the operation of the Oklahoma pooling statute in relation to Indian lands). One reason the issue is dealt
with so clumsily in the cases is that, under the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g
(1983), minerals could only be developed under leases; there was no statutory authority to act as an operator.
Under the Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2108 (1983), however, myriad forms
of developmental ventures are authorized and the problem of what to do with a lapsed lease will no longer be
such a problem. The essential problem of the extent of secretarial authority in approving communitization
agreements may well return in conjunction with the new developmental forms.
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enne-Arapaho, the lease's expiration was essentially mandated, as the
communitization agreement should not have been approved.9 This communiti-
zation agreement covered 640 acres, the largest unit allowed in Oklahoma,'
and as a gas well, it may never be re-spaced and made into smaller spacing
units.' As Woods considers drilling and spacing units and communitization
agreements synonymous, the practical result, then, is that the Cheyenne-Arapa-
ho tracts may not be communitized, under Woods, unless circumstances change,
and should not have been allowed to participate in the drilling and spacing unit
as unleased owners. With the unlikelihood of changing drilling and spacing
units, Woods practically mandates the approval of communitization agreements
if the Indian owner wishes to participate at all. This effectively creates the
rubber-stamping so despised in Kenai and Cheyenne-Arapaho, and is yet anoth-
er area where the two sides of this issue fail to meet.
One final disagreement between the two tongues of these cases is the tim-
ing of submitting the communitization agreement for approval. Of course, the
length of time between submission and expiration of the lease will affect which
factors receive more weight; the further from the expiration of the lease, any
possible financial gains from letting the lease lapse, or pursuing other modes of
development, the more speculative both become. The issue here, however, is the
amount of time given the administrator to make his or her decision. Kenai and
Cheyenne-Arapaho may be read to treat the amount of time available to the
administrator as a factor in weighing the best interests of the Indian or tribe.
Cotton and Woods, however, find that as long as the agreement was submitted
before the lease expired, time will not be a factor.
IV. ANALYSIS
In reaching their substantive judgments then, what values does the court
promote? Were there to be a pooling clause in leases on fee land which re-
quired the lessors' approval before the tract could be pooled, there would be
little question that the lessors would have the right to deny pooling if they so
chose. Moreover, an executive interest holder94 who approves pooling under
such a clause in a rising market will surely be liable to the royalty interest
owners for the forgone income of new bonuses. Such is the case with the Indi-
an lease forms. A communitization clause is included, but it is not automatic. In
order to be effective and include the leased land within the unit it must be
approved.
91. See Cheyenne-Arapaho, 966 F.2d at 591.
92. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1 (Supp. 1996).
93. Gas can migrate farther within a formation than oil. One well often efficiently drains a 640 acre
section of land. Such spacing units are common for gas.
94. One who has the authority to lease on behalf, or for the benefit, of owners of royalty interest. The
duty owed by the executive interest holder may be good faith, utmost good faith, or even a fiduciary duty,
depending upon circumstances and jurisdiction.
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In Cotton and Woods the court reads into the Indian lease clause an expec-
tation that simply does not exist in normal oil and gas leases. The leases that
were negotiated had a pooling (communitization) clause that required the
Secretary's approval before they could become effective. The companies took
the leases knowing that a fiduciary's authorization would have to be forthcom-
ing before the pooling clause could be relied upon, yet in Cotton and Woods the
court protects the company's expectation interest in the pooling clauses. Protec-
tion of the commercial interests over that of the Indian beneficiary should not
comport with the trust responsibility.
There is obviously a conflict. The original Woods court recognized this and
stated:
[We are again called upon to address and resolve the tensions arising
from the confluence of a number of legitimate interests: 1) the right of a
state to establish drilling units to control the development of its oil re-
sources; 2) the duty of the United States Department of the Interior to
protect and maximize the return to Indians from their allotted lands; 3) the
contractual rights of oil producing companies such as plaintiffs, which
commit millions of dollars in drilling costs in reliance on provisions in
leases executed with both Indian and non-Indian landowners with full
knowledge of the Department of the Interior, and 4) the expectations of
all lessees of a state-mandated drilling unit to receive approval from the
Secretary of the Interior as to Indian leases of a duly-executed
communitization agreement allocating proportional revenues from oil
production to each tract in the drilling unit regardless of whether or not a
producing well is drilled on a particular tract within the unit or not.95
How effectively does the Woods I court state the conflict? As to the first
interest, it totally ignores the force of federal preemption and the Secretary's
authority (or duty) to exercise control over oil resources belonging to the Unit-
ed States (even if within the geographic boundaries of Oklahoma). The second
interest may be fairly stated. The third interest is certainly sizable, at least in
monetary terms, but its relative weight in comparison to other interests is in-
deed the question at issue. The final interest, though suffering from the lack of
differentiation between drilling and spacing units and communitization, perhaps
comes closest to addressing the basic conflict.
It is the public, or national, interest in the orderly and efficient develop-
ment of mineral resources, maximizing overall recovery, and promoting a prof-
itable industry in order to sustain development that weighs against the interests
of the Indians. Though conservation is accomplished under state law, the federal
government has, from the beginning, been involved in the promotion and main-
tenance of the oil industry. The long pattern of federal acquiescence to state
regulation promotes the goals of orderly development and works well, most of
the time. Only when the market experienced explosive growth in speculative
value for new leases did the conflict of interest materialize.
95. Woods I, 18 F.3d at 855.
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A. Conflicts of Interest in Indian Law
In these cases is demonstrated the difficulty experienced when multiple,
and not always consistent, public policies operate in the same circumstances.
The most common conflict experienced in Indian law is that of division of
loyalties within administrative agencies; charged with representing the Indian
interest and the public interest in general. As stated by President Nixon in 1970:
The United States government acts as a legal trustee for the land and
water rights of American Indians. These rights are often of critical eco-
nomic importance to the Indian people; frequently they are also the sub-
ject of extensive legal dispute. In many of these legal confrontations, the
Federal government is faced with an inherent conflict of interest. The
Secretary of the Interior and the Attorney General must at the same time
advance both the national interest in the use of land and water rights and
the private interests of Indians in land which the government holds as
trustee.96
Resolution of this conflict has resulted in many different approaches, run-
ning the gamut between complete deference to Indian interests to complete
ignorance of them. In arguing for a position closer to the former, in conjunction
with congressional investigation of the conflict of interest problem, Reid Cham-
bers noted:
This "conflict" then, is not one which properly can be resolved through
the process of balancing conflicting interests. Such a balancing procedure
within the executive department is desirable where competing public
policies are being balanced; this, of course, is the method by which public
policy is formulated. But private rights, which the United States is obli-
gated as a fiduciary to defend, cannot be so balanced against conflicting
public purposes. The government's relationship to the Indians is, in this
respect, unique in character.'
Recently, Professor Judith Royster has stated the issue more strongly.
"Balancing the tribal interest against public considerations, and in particular
subordinating the tribal interest to public interests represented by agencies such
as the BLM, violates the Secretary's trust obligations to the Indian tribes."98
Many conflict of interest cases have been decided regarding the allocation of
water. Where the Department of Interior was charged .by Congress to carry out
reclamation activities, the Supreme Court found that the burdens of complying
with congressional objectives of reclamation and the trust responsibility of the
Indians would have to be carried on "two shoulders." Professor Royster finds
conflicts jurisprudence developed in such cases inapplicable to mineral develop-
ment on the Indian land itself. Unlike water management, mineral development
96. Message of President Nixon to the Congress, 116 CONG. REc 23,131 (1970).
97. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 91ST CONG., 2D SEss., A STUDY OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST IN THE PROTECTION OF INDIAN NATURAL RESOURCES 3 (Comm. Print 1971) (by Reid P. Chambers)
(discussing eight instances of conflicts of interest within the Department of Interior between 1967 and 1970).
98. Royster, supra note 6, at 329.
99. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
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is based on the full fiduciary duty. "Because of that full fiduciary relationship,
the balancing approach of the off-reservation cases is inappropriate. The Secre-
tary is obligated under the mineral development scheme not to weigh tribal
interests against public values, but to act in the best interests of the mineral
owning tribes.' '. When the federal government acts with respect to tribal
minerals, its obligation is thus not to reconcile competing interests, but to act as
a trustee for the benefit of the mineral owners."''
Another view of the trust doctrine, one gaining momentum in recent years,
is the concept of increased sovereignty through greater autonomy.'" The cur-
rent push is for putting management and commercial decisions in the hands of
the tribes." Efforts are also underway to allow the tribes to make their own
management decisions. Indeed, this has been the aim during the last era of
Indian policy, that of Indian self determination.' °' Robert Clinton has stated
this position as follows:
[F]ederal Indian law should move back to Chief Justice Marshall's con-
ception of the trust responsibility as a doctrine that simply involves feder-
al legal obligations of protection of Indian tribes against intrusions from
third parties on their lands, resources, and sovereignty. Federal Indian law
should move away from the models of federally supervised Indian re-
source development set forth in the 1938 Mineral Leasing Act and the
1982 Indian Mineral Development Act. Rather, the tribes, with technical
assistance from the United States, should assume the ultimate responsibili-
ty for their deals. No federal approval should be required. The tribal gov-
ernments should be required to assume the political accountability if and
when those deals go sour."
These two differing views of the trust relationship are mirrored in the four
cases discussed. The call for responsibility and accountability in mineral man-
agement is evident in Cotton and Woods. If the 7-2 en banc decision in Woods
may be taken as an indication of the court's position in the future, we can ex-
pect further litigation. For until the Bureau of Indian Affairs is relieved of lia-
bility for breach of trust, they will continue to be aggressive in asserting their
trust responsibility. Institutional inertia and reluctance on part of the Indians
themselves in many cases will slow the process."
100. Royster, supra note 6, at 358-59.
101. Id. at 360.
102. See, e.g., Comment, Rethinking the Trust Doctrine in Federal Indian Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 422
(1984).
103. PEVAR, supra note 3, at 8.
104. This period began in 1968. See id.
105. Federal Trust Responsibility and Conflicts of Interest: Environmental Protection or Natural Resource
Development?, 71 N.D. L. REv. 365, 373-74 (1995) (proceedings from the North Dakota Law Review Sym-
posium Conference, statement of Robert Clinton).
106. CANBY, supra note 3, at 50-51.
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B. Standard of Review and Role of the Court
As noted, the "all relevant factors" razor has been applied to four different
cases to find, under the trust responsibility the United States owes the Indian
tribes, what is in the "best interest" of the Indian beneficiary. In all these cases
it is recognized that the Secretary has broad discretion in dispatching his trust
responsibility, yet contrary to standard administrative law practice, when con-
fronted with a situation where an administrative decision maker has not consid-
ered every option, the cases have not been remanded for reconsideration, but
instead, as the factor upon which the Secretary did or did not base his decision
was known, the court simply substituted the "proper" decision.
This phenomenon was apparent from the beginning of these two lines of
cases. In dissenting in Kenai, Judge Barrett felt that, where the conservation-
development aspects of a communitization plan are justified, the fact that the
Superintendent foresees a sizable bonus from another lessee, if he refuses to
commit an Indian lease to the unit involved, would be contrary to the public
interest. Judge Barrett also felt the lessee was entitled to rely on the pooling
covenant in the leases."l In the next case on the issue, Cotton, Judge Barrett
wrote the majority opinion." s Judge Barrett used the same arguments in sup-
porting the Cotton majority opinion, and elaborated on the conservation aspects
of the decision, but ultimately found that "the Secretary simply failed to set
forth, discuss and analyze all of the factors his own guidelines and [the] Kenai
opinion required of him."'"
Considering the varied outcomes in light of the trust responsibility, it may
be questioned whether such a procedural test is the proper tool for review. The
trust doctrine has been the source of two opposing visions, one emphasizing
federal power, the other emphasizing federal responsibility."0 The effect of
this conflicting vision can be seen in the courts. In Judge Seymour's dissenting
opinion in Jicarilla Apache v. Supron Energy Corp.," she noted,
the most significant error the majority makes is its employment of admin-
istrative law analysis without considering what role, if any, the Secretary's
fiduciary duty should play in a court's examination of his administrative
action. [T]he Secretary's actions in a situation like this are constrained by
principles of Indian trust obligations as well as by principles of adminis-
trative law."'
107. See Kenai, 671 F.2d at 389 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
108. Judge McKay, who wrote the majority Kenai opinion, was now in the dissent. See Cotton, 870 F.2d
at 1529 (McKay, J., dissenting).
109. Cotton, 870 F.2d at 1527.
110. CLINTON Er AL., supra note 6, at 249.
111. 728 F.2d 1555 (10th Cir. 1984) (Seymour, J., dissenting), dissent adopted as maj. op. on reh'g en
banc, 782 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1986).
112. Id. at 1566-67.
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Other courts, however, are willing to resolve the issue of the Secretary's
duties under principles of administrative law alone. 13 Just such a schism is
evident in the four opinions examined in this paper. It is the second school of
thought, of course, that has allowed the Tenth Circuit to harmonize the four
cases discussed. By working from the premise that administrative principles
alone are adequate, the substantive basis behind Cheyenne-Arapaho and Kenai
need not even be addressed, much less explained. The "all relevant factors"
analysis of Cotton and Woods has done just that.
V. CONCLUSION
A conflict exists within the Tenth Circuit. The conflict may be seen as
differing views over the concept of the trust relationship or of administrative
practice. Until a unified view is adopted, litigation over Indian rights and the
federal trust responsibility will continue. Though outwardly conforming to es-
tablished precedent in their "all relevant factors" test, in substantive reasoning
and outcome the Tenth Circuit will continue to speak with a forked tongue.
113. See Pawnee v. United States, 830 F.2d 187 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating in regard to royalty calculation
under 25 U.S.C. § 396, "[t]he scope and extent of the fiduciary relationship, with respect to this particular
matter, is established by the regulation and leases"), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988); see also CLINTON ET
AL., supra note 6, at 253-55.
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